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Abstract 
This article outlines the current situation with regard to the Lord’s Resistance Army 
and the possibilities for peace in Northern Uganda. It seeks to add to the discourse 
on rethinking Africa’s international relations in the context of a specific conflict and 
with regard to a specific tool of the international community: the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and its involvement in issuing warrants for insurgency leaders in October 
2005. The article discusses the role of traditional justice systems and the ICC in 
ending the war, concluding that justice in Northern Uganda requires an end to the 
false dichotomy of ‘traditional’ and ICC approaches and that the two must 
complement each other in order to address the different groups within the LRA and 
the Acholi population.  
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 2 
‘The bullets whine on the last afternoon. 
The wind is up and full of ashes, 
dispersing the day and the formless 
war, and the victory belongs to them, 
to the barbarians…’1 
 
Introduction 
This article outlines the current situation with regard to the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the possibilities for peace in Northern Uganda. It seeks to add to the 
discourse on rethinking Africa’s international relations in the context of a specific 
conflict and with regard to a specific tool of the international community: the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and its involvement in issuing warrants for 
insurgency leaders in October 2005. 
It is argued that the ICC represents a particular expression of the ‘English School’ or 
‘International Society’ approach to International Relations (IR) whereby a particular 
view of what constitutes international law and, by extension what constitute human 
rights, can be enshrined in a world society.2 Furthermore, the ICC, through 
independent action and the appointment of an Independent Prosecutor, is 
theoretically capable of transcending states.3 The article contends that external 
actors operate within a standard, or at least coherent idea of how to resolve conflict 
based around the idea of the liberal peace. Furthermore, the liberal peace can be 
characterised as a key part of the relationship between the international community 
and Africa.  
The implication of the current state of the peace talks and the approach to peace 
taken by Uganda and international actors is that peace is likely to fail. This is not 
entirely down to the failure of the ICC, and is as much down to the involvement of 
other states in the conflict, including Sudan, the DRC and Central African Republic, 
divisions within the LRA itself and also the inability of the ICC to fulfil its mandate.  
The article does not argue against the idea of the ICC and certainly does not see 
‘traditional justice’ as an obvious way out, as has been suggested in Uganda, or even 
for a complete withdrawal of the ICC. Rather it argues that due to the history of the 
conflict the ICC approach is unlikely to achieve peace since there may be a 
significant group of rebels who will reject the involvement of the ICC, and also the 
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ICC’s inability to act beyond the purview of the Ugandan state, which has an interest 
in the outcome of any public hearing.  Consequently the people of northern Uganda 
are left excluded from any form of justice system since they are left with a form of 
traditional justice that implies a lack of external involvement, particularly from the 
Ugandan Government. The only possible answer, therefore, is that justice in 
Northern Uganda requires an end to the false dichotomy of ‘traditional’ and ICC 
approaches and that the two must complement each other in order to address the 
different groups within the LRA and the Acholi population. 
This article begins by outlining the involvement of the ICC and the assumptions 
underlying its approach. It takes a long-term view of the conflict in northern Uganda, 
seeing Kony’s current violence as part of a long-term cycle of violence1. The article 
briefly outlines the nature of the conflict and then moves on to look in more detail at 
the intervention of the ICC and the accompanying rebranding of the LRA as 
‘terrorists’. The politics of this approach have specific implications for any outcomes 
from a peace process in the region and also the future of ICC intervention in support 
of liberal approaches to peacebuilding based around global ideas of human rights 
and rule of law. 
The ICC and the liberal peace 
The background to the formation of the ICC and its link to international relations more 
broadly is most clearly seen through the link to international society, as outlined by IR 
scholars to mean universal individual rights in the Grotian tradition, that are 
constituted by individuals and non-state groups and recognised by them, rather than 
through rights as defined by states.4 The Rome Statute itself in many ways 
represents an expression of liberal views of universal human rights that seek to 
protect the individual from justice that is the sole preserve of the state. This 
expression of human rights is at the very core of liberal peace theories of post-
conflict reconstruction.  
A comprehensive discussion of the liberal peace is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but essentially the core argument is very simple. Following John Gray (1986), the 
liberal ideology can be reduced to four core themes: individualism (assertion of 
individuals over social collectivities); egalitarianism (moral equivalence of 
                                               
1 Joseph Kony is the leader of the Lord’s resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. He is a 
notoriously difficult and enigmatic figure, claiming magical powers and ruling the LRA severely 
through internal pogroms and a cult of personality. He claims to be possessed by a series of spirit 
advisers. These include Silly Silindi (a strategist), Ing Chu (who turns tanks into toys), Juma Osiris 
(Amin’s former minister and once leader of the West Nile Front) and Major Bianca (his American head 
of intelligence). 
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individuals); universalism (moral unity having primacy over historical association or 
cultural forms); and meliorism (belief in the ability to improve all political and social 
institutions). All of these elements surround the core principle of individual freedom. 
Given the above, a liberal peace exists when all of the above constitute normal social 
relations. For peace to exist, justice and liberty are required, and the liberal political 
arrangements that make this possible are seen as inherently peaceful. Critically, 
democracy and capitalism are seen as the vehicles for peaceful competition 
underlying liberal structures where even loser groups can have faith in a system that 
does not oppress their beliefs (Doyle, 1997). Michael Doyle goes on to add that the 
normative foundations of liberalism are encompassed in the liberal notion of human 
rights. At their highest level these are the right to freedom from arbitrary authority, the 
social rights necessary to protect and promote freedom and the right to democratic 
participation to protect the first two (Doyle, 1997). Consequently when international 
intervention is undertaken in the name of human rights it is entirely coherent to 
initiate a process of democratisation as a means of developing social rights, including 
juridical equity (Liden, 2005). Clearly it is the transfer of the political architecture of 
the liberal state from western liberal countries to non-liberal states in the form of 
state-building that leads to a tension between the pacific nature of liberalism and the 
issue of whether those structures really are the political manifestation of the moral 
freedom of the local populations (Liden, 2005). 
This has led to a number of important developments in terms of peacebuilding, not 
least the idea that a post-Westphalian international liberal peace requires non-liberal 
states to be liberalised in order for that peace to become sustainable. Consequently, 
the chief aim of peace operations changes from creating negotiated solutions 
between states to actively contributing to the construction of liberal states, economies 
and social structures intended to spread liberal-democratic political structures 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2004). It is this idea that Mark Duffield claims lies behind the 
merger of security and development policy and the reproblematisation of security as 
both the result of, and precondition of, development more broadly (Duffield, 2001). 
A further expression of the pacific and international nature of the liberal peace is the 
idea that human rights are universal and that they should be enforced as such, 
regardless of the wishes of states. The Rome Statute not only developed this idea 
further by outlining a consensus on universal human values, but also created an 
international legal mechanism for independent enforcement of those values – the 
ICC.  
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The Rome Statute itself was signed by 120 countries with only 7 countries in 
opposition, although these included the US and Sudan. The Rome Conference itself 
also included around 250 non-governmental organisations in order to represent 
voices outside the fraternity of states. This is clearly reflected in the outcome which 
was a document that reaches beyond the conventional view of international law. In 
particular, the Statute was not ratified by a conventional multilateral agreement 
between consenting states but by the ‘supranationalism of a non-unanimous vote’ 
(Ralph 2005: 36).5 An influential effect of this move is to widen the process of referral 
to international justice mechanisms beyond the community of states and particularly 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council. By establishing the office of an 
Independent Prosecutor, the Statute provides an avenue for individuals and non-
governmental actors, not necessarily represented by states, to pursue formal, 
international justice. 
Whilst theoretically empowered to investigate acts of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ‘aggression’, there are significant brakes on the powers of the 
ICC.6 Apart from pressure from the US as a non-signatory, the ICC has no powers of 
enforcement, but has to rely on ICC member states to cooperate. When president 
Museveni referred the case of the LRA to the ICC in December 2003 it became the 
first major case taken up by the court and so became a critical test case. However, 
because of the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the situation is somewhat 
precarious. For example, the statute has not been implemented into Ugandan law 
and stands in potential opposition to the Amnesty Act, until this is repealed or lapses.  
Inevitably this means that the ICC in Uganda is dependent upon the Ugandan state, 
which is, of course, a protagonist in the conflict. It also means that effectively the ICC 
has been asked to deal with criminal activity that is outside the control and capacity 
of the Ugandan judicial system. This not only means that the ICC is effectively acting 
on behalf of the Ugandan state, but also implies that if the peace process requires 
the withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants on Kony and others, it is incumbent on the 
Ugandan state to supply evidence that any justice approach adopted is now within 
the capacity and jurisdiction of the Ugandan authorities. At a minimum this puts the 
ICC into an extremely difficult situation since the use of international human rights 
legislation appears to have been utilised to the benefit of one side in a conflict – and 
one that is partly complicit in similar activities to those being investigated. 
Indeed, Allen (2005), amongst others, suggests that a move to re-examine traditional 
justice as an alternative to the ICC warrants is partly due to a realisation on the part 
of the Ugandan Government that the LRA, if accused, will be able to prepare a 
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defence as part of any trial and this could prove to be extremely embarrassing for the 
Ugandan Government. Furthermore, there is clearly an advantage to using traditional 
systems since it implies that the Acholi are somehow ‘primitive’ and not ready for 
modern judicial systems, in addition to the treatment of the insurgency as an internal 
Northern Ugandan conflict not involving outsiders, rather than the regional conflict 
that it became. The traditional justice systems discussed to date will not include the 
Government of Uganda as an active protagonist in the war and are designed to 
facilitate forgiveness and reconciliation within communities. 
Kony himself is subject to an ICC warrant and divining his intentions have proved 
extremely difficult. He is clearly the spiritual leader of the LRA as well as the heart of 
the insurgency. However he is unlikely to submit to a transitional justice system that 
he sees as externally imposed and does not provide a platform for an adequate 
defence. Clearly several local Acholi leaders had confidence in local amnesties and 
traditional justice processes that were being discussed with the LRA, but they have 
been greatly unsettled by the idea that this could be undermined by western ideas of 
justice that make Kony and others individually responsible for LRA atrocities. By 
2005 this had reached such a stage that the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
discussed these issues with several Acholi leaders and reassured them that the ICC 
warrants would not undermine local efforts (ICC, 2005). However, it is difficult to see 
how Kony himself could submit to local justice approaches and at the same time 
escape the ICC. For him, therefore, giving himself up is an unlikely outcome and he 
is likely to stay in the bush. The only question remains how far he is likely to take up 
violence. 
The LRA, the Acholi and the marginalisation of Northern Uganda 
Both Acholi leaders Alice Lawkena and Joseph Kony blamed the sins of the Acholi 
themselves for almost destroying their group2. They both believed that the Acholi 
were about to be wiped out in massacres and reprisals driving them to look for a 
spiritual escape. Whilst it would be an obvious conclusion to draw that the religious 
                                               
2 Alice Lawkena is a pivotal figure within Uganda as the leader of the then Holy Spirit Mobile Force, 
which later partly changed into the LRA. Alice herself is a complicated story. The Holy Spirit Lakwena 
is the spirit of an Italian who died during the First World War and this spirit took possession of Alice 
on May 25th 1985. First, Lakwena directed Alice towards healing, but then redefined her purpose as the 
head of the HSM. Some former soldiers joined Alice and won a small skirmish at Kilak Corner in 
November 1986. This victory convinced several others that Alice did indeed have ‘the power’. She 
persuaded her followers to wear oil and amulets as protection from bullets and controlled her force 
through a series of bizarre ‘commandments’ including banning taking cover behind anthills. The 
HSMF was remarkably successful in the short term, partly since Uganda troops, faced with hymn-
singing in response to bullets must have found it unnerving. The HSM was finally defeated just outside 
Jinja in 1987 
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cover was just that: a cover to disguise a deeper political motive, it is difficult to 
sustain this in the face of the evidence. Clearly one of the key drivers of such a long 
conflict is fear (See Jackson, 2002, Vinci, 2005). When the National Resistance Army 
(NRA) took power in 1986, the remaining Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) 
forces, most of which were led by Acholi, fled north, fearing reprisals. Civilians in 
Acholi-land also feared the worst. The history of political takeovers in Uganda had 
not been a happy one and the Acholi had been involved in several massacres as 
either perpetrators or victims. Their fears were partially confirmed in several clumsy 
actions by the Government and in the actions of some NRA soldiers. 
These events fed the paranoia already rampant amongst the Acholi. Eventually, fear 
led to despair at the lack of development and vast numbers of people became 
susceptible to the belief that the end was near for the Acholi. Despair led to 
desperation and Alice offered them a way out: redemption. Her argument was that 
the Acholi have found themselves near economic destruction and need to reject past 
failures. Alice’s solution was a rejection of modernity and a retreat to spiritualism 
based on the traditional cosmology of the Acholi with added Biblical elements. This 
was carried forward by Kony and the events of 1994 and his ‘betrayal’ by Acholi 
elders appears to have hardened his outlook. His desperation in the face of Acholi 
indifference in many cases, led to his turning violent on his own people. The young 
were abducted, because not only were they easier to indoctrinate, but also because 
Kony had effectively given up on the adults (Jackson, 2002; Vinci, 2005). This left the 
majority of the population stranded between the LRA on one hand and a hostile army 
on the other, leading to widespread marginalisation that feeds into current demands 
for justice and rehabilitation. 
The civilian population is both the key and the victim. The widespread internment of 
civilians in camps and the abduction of children effectively leaves the population in a 
constant state of fear and insecurity. Abduction of children and their incorporation 
into the LRA creates a negative support network amongst the Acholi. Virtually every 
extended family in Acholi-land has had someone abducted. Families of the abducted 
are less likely to support the Government against their own family and so ‘… your 
own child is living as a rebel. So if the rebels come through and demand food or 
information, it is not only your fear for yourself, you think also of your child, and hope 
that your own child is not hungry’ (Human Rights Watch, 1997).  
How can a combatant with a malevolent cel (spirit) go back to the community he/she 
has committed violence against? One of the core features of this war has been that 
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violence has been committed primarily against their own ethnicity in a nihilistic path 
of self-destruction.  
Paranoia is primarily about perceptions. In particular, it matters little what is actually 
happening, if there is an alternate perception of what is happening. The Acholi have 
a number of collective beliefs about the motivations of the Government that are 
based mainly on rumour but that greatly contribute to their marginalisation within 
Uganda. Firstly, there is land. Under colonial rule, settlers could effectively grab any 
land not currently under cultivation and claim it as ‘unused’ or not effectively owned. 
The current Gulu District Plan identifies only around 10% of land as being currently 
cultivated, leaving 90% not ‘effectively’ owned. This situation has led many Acholi to 
believe and openly state that the Government is engaged in a vast resettlement plan 
to push out the Acholi and replace them with southerners. Perhaps more far-fetched, 
but equally powerful, is the view that Tutsis from Rwanda will be settled in the north 
by Museveni, a reference to the widespread use of Rwandan Tutsi troops by the 
NRA and the close links between Uganda and Rwandan Tutsis, not least the 
personal links between Paul Kagame and Museveni. The resettlement argument, of 
course, also provides a convenient explanation for Museveni’s failure to win the war. 
After all, since the majority of the victims are Acholi, how better to depopulate the 
region? 
A third strand of marginalisation concerns the nature of the Acholi economy and 
particularly the Government de-stocking of the Acholi cattle population. Between 
1986 and 1987, when the cattle exodus happened, Westbrook (2000) estimates that 
the cattle population of Kitgum fell from 156,667 to 3,239, whilst the national cattle 
stock rose from 3 to 5.6 million. The Acholi certainly believe that the Government and 
the army were implicated in the theft of their cattle (Finnstrom, 1999). It is difficult to 
over-estimate the importance of cattle to the peoples of northern Uganda. Cattle 
represent the bedrock of the economy and the main way of accumulating capital. 
Cattle provided a significant source of draught animals, food, wedding dowries, and 
acted as a means to settle disputes. Removing cattle from Acholi-land effectively 
removed one of the main roots of Acholi society. 
Lastly, perceptions have not been helped by the view of many southerners, 
particularly in the armed forces, who see their service in the north as being virtually in 
another country. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) –the former NRA -  
have been guilty of a series of violations of human rights that fuel bitterness amongst 
the Acholi, including systematic rape of both men and women, usually in the 
presence of their families, the murder of civilians, and the burying alive of civilians by 
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soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Whilst many southerners are, at best, in denial 
about these issues, many also blame the Acholi themselves. Lt. General Kazini of the 
UPDF attributes the abuses of the Acholi by the UPDF to the nature of Acholi society 
itself, stating ‘If anything, it is the local Acholi soldiers causing the problems. It’s the 
cultural background of the people here; they are very violent. It’s genetic.’ (Van 
Acker, 2003).  
Consequently the marginalisation of the Acholi has been partly mental and partly 
material. There is a lot of evidence that the rebellion is fairly clearly based on quite 
rational, historically-grounded, material grievances and security fears in northern 
Uganda. However, this goes along with a mystic/religious/cult character of the LRA 
and its predecessors. Where the balance lies is important for how a peace might be 
negotiated – if it’s the former then Government deals (power sharing, redistributive 
deals for example) and security arrangements might be sufficient for peace. 
However, the combination of a lack of trust of the Government and a paranoid 
ideology adds a significant variable into an already fragmenting LRA. On a pragmatic 
level it is not actually clear, beyond Kony himself, who has any authority to negotiate 
on behalf of the LRA in any peace process. It is against this background that the 
Ugandan Government invited the intervention of the ICC. 
Ceasefire, amnesty, the ICC and a liberal peace 
A liberal peace relies on the twin pillars of individual rights and economic freedom 
backed up by democratic representation producing peace in itself, without of course 
recognising that there is evidence to suggest that they can be sources of further 
conflict (Sriram, 2007). In addition, the idea of a liberal peace representing a global 
hegemony in a Gramscian sense relies in part on the existence of a local hegemony 
that is lacking in the African state (Taylor, 2007). In the Ugandan context, the state 
became a vehicle through which various competing groups tried to access resources 
and power – the Acholi amongst them. The root of the current insurgency can, in fact, 
be seen in the replacement of an Acholi elite by an alternative led by Museveni. 
However, it is part of the premise of this paper that the LRA has diverged 
considerably from this original root, and that conventional peace negotiations along 
the lines of power-sharing, are likely to lead to dysfunctional outcomes. 
There are echoes of earlier peace negotiations and rifts in the Acholi approaches to 
the peace negotiations that are on-going at the time of writing. Kony and his core 
supporters are currently in northern DRC where there is effectively no military 
solution to their presence. A significant portion of the LRA is also being pursued 
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within Equatoria Province of southern Sudan where the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement has led to some stability and an agreement with the UPDF. At the same 
time, there are thought to be no active LRA cells remaining in northern Uganda and 
currently there is peace. Within the peace negotiations, however, the old rift of 1993 
between those who are in the Acholi diaspora, and those led by Kony, is effectively 
stalling the negotiations. There is little agreement between them as to the aims of the 
negotiations and more specifically, what Kony wants out of any peace agreement, 
particularly given the existence of warrants from the International Court on him and 
his close associates. It seems doubtful that he will just hand himself over to the 
UPDF in order to stand trial. 
At the same time, the Acholi diaspora group appear to have little or no idea of what 
Kony seeks from the negotiations themselves and there is a real question of 
legitimacy hanging over this group. Several members of the group are from radically 
different backgrounds and disagree openly on a number of key issues. There are 
questions over how far their set of demands from the Ugandan Government, actually 
tally with Acholi wishes given that several members of this group have not lived in 
Acholi-land in several years7. Some are refugees from previous regimes and retain 
some of that bias, whereas several are younger and have a different emphasis, 
without the perceived right to resources of the prior military, for example. The 
relationship between the LRA and the political group, the Lord’s Resistance 
Movement (LRM) mirrors the NRA/M dichotomy of Museveni’s original group, but is 
an unstable one. Kony himself describes the LRA as the LRA/M in several 
documents, but before the Juba talks began in 2007 the LRA did not have any clear 
political strategy and the LRM itself is split without a single clear direction.  
Kony’s tactics have been deliberately pitched at misdirection throughout the talks, 
with the aim, seemingly, of trying to discover what options are open to him. Whatever 
can be levelled at Kony, he has certainly proved himself to be astute when it comes 
to the management of information, personal images and intelligence, and so the idea 
that he may be assessing his options is a very real possibility. At the same time, 
there can obviously be no peace without Kony, and certainly no peace if he cannot 
be brought to a negotiating table. This has been clearly recognised by the 
Government that regards a deal with Kony as paramount since he is the leader of the 
LRA. 
There are a number of key factors affecting the current peace talks. Firstly, the 
nature of the LRA group itself is problematic. Several of the fighters have been in the 
bush for some time and have no experience of negotiations. Furthermore, many of 
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them have never known peace, having been abducted young and then brutalised 
over several years. Most have been comprehensively indoctrinated into Kony’s vision 
and the use of terror as a control mechanism. They are woefully equipped to deal 
with peace negotiations of any type without significant external support. 
Secondly, the LRA has a rigidly hierarchical structure with Kony as its undisputed 
head. With the LRM leadership in internal dispute and with no real links into Kony 
and the LRA, its relevance as a representative group with which to negotiate is open 
to question. At the same time there have been reports that Kony’s leadership may be 
compromised and from February to April 2008 we saw several instances of fighting 
between LRA groups, which suggests that there may be a prospect of less fanatical 
groups coming in from the bush leaving only the hardcore of the LRA with Kony. 
Thirdly, Kony’s legitimacy as being representative of the northern Uganda people, 
who have borne the brunt of the conflict, must also be questioned. Kony himself 
holds the key to peace – a cult cannot function without its high priest. Remove the 
high priest and the structure falls apart. This raises the critical question of the nature 
of justice and the warrants issued by the ICC on Kony and others. In particular, in 
northern Uganda there is a fundamental tension between a number of different 
factors affecting the participation of Kony in the peace process. At a formal level, 
there is a tension between the Amnesty Act of 2000, which appears to give amnesty 
to all those combatants who voluntarily come out of the bush, and the ICC that seeks 
to prosecute those held responsible for the war. Museveni himself has been playing a 
double game of supporting the Amnesty Act, but requesting the ICC to intervene in 
2003.8 This also puts the ICC in an awkward position in acting on behalf of the 
Ugandan state, which is involved in the war. Certainly the perception of some 
observers is that the ICC has allowed itself to be subject to the political needs of the 
Ugandan state and consequently has come to be seen on the ground as a potential 
obstacle to a successful outcome of the Juba peace talks. The existence of the 
warrants have certainly mitigated against direct talks with the leadership of the LRA.  
The Government itself has gone on record as saying that they will withdraw their 
referral to the ICC if Kony and others will accept traditional forms of justice. However, 
the Government can only withdraw the warrants if they can prove to the ICC that 
traditional justice systems are now part of the capability of the Ugandan judicial 
system. This double standard of maintaining a general call for an Amnesty and a 
specific demand for individual accountability for Kony, was reinforced by an 
additional Bill in 2003 granting the Government the right to exclude specific LRA 
individuals from the right to Amnesty. However, the real issue is how to persuade 
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Kony to come in from a position where there is no military solution and where Kony 
does not need to win – he just needs to not lose.  
Among all of these discussions the people of northern Uganda wait for an 
improvement in their position. Caught between an army that they do not trust 
because of an unfortunate history, and the LRA, which has been peculiarly vicious in 
its pursuit of the Acholi, northern Ugandans hold deeply fissured views of the LRA. 
On the one hand they are ‘the enemy’ but on the other the LRA largely consist of 
abducted children from these communities. Dolan (2005) puts forward the view that 
the war is just a mask for perpetrating mass social torture on the population with all 
sides and other actors keeping the war going for this purpose. For the peace 
process, this means that a wider range of actors have to be drawn in to recognise 
that the war is about more than the LRA versus the Government. Consequently, the 
people of northern Uganda tend to be very much in favour of any approach that will 
end the violence.  
Many northern Ugandans see the intervention of the ICC as being biased and as 
undermining the flawed, but ultimately effective local justice mechanisms for 
amnesty, that involve an element of confession, but also allow for the reconstruction 
of core narratives that conflict tends to break down. The stories of individuals and 
what happened to them after abduction are an important part of the healing process 
for the community as a whole. The ICC’s approach has been to receive the concerns 
of a variety of Acholi groups.  The idea of transitional justice – a key element of 
constructing a liberal peace – may itself lead to further destabilisation of northern 
Uganda. In particular, the formal justice system has never been part of the core 
access to justice for most local people and what formal justice system existed before 
the war has largely collapsed. The ideas of human rights and individual accountability 
represented by the ICC warrants represent an external imposition to many Acholi that 
could make the behaviour of the LRA even worse (Sriram, 2007).  
What are the likely outcomes of current approaches? 
This is clearly a complex situation on the ground. However, the approach to peace 
followed by Uganda is in danger of failing on a number of levels, not least at the level 
of the ICC and the international community. A close association with the Ugandan 
state in terms of the enactment of the warrants has tainted the approach in the eyes 
of many Acholi. However, there is a danger of turning down a route to justice that 
relies solely on traditional justice mechanisms, even if it could be decided what those 
mechanisms might be.9 In particular, a change in stance of the Government towards 
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the acceptance of traditional justice mechanisms can be viewed as an attempt to 
avoid its own complicity in the conflict coming to light in a formal court, which would 
undoubtedly happen if the ICC were to prosecute the case. 
For the Government of Uganda the advantage is in containing the war within the 
Acholi and of branding it as an internal war with which they have had very little 
contact, which is clearly untrue. This would lead to a situation where the Acholi were 
forgiving their own kind using traditional mechanisms because they were not viewed 
as being sophisticated enough to use modern judicial systems (Allen, 2005).  
An important question is whether the ICC’s perception (and practice) of justice could 
be effective in bringing in the LRA and Kony in particular. This remains a difficult 
question and is not helped by the dichotomy constructed between traditional justice 
systems on the one hand and formal systems on the other. It is clear that Kony will 
not come in merely in response to the warrants although it is also clear that the 
involvement of the ICC has moved the peace process to a position of more 
promise.10 However the LRA view the ICC warrants as being an instrument of state 
blame for the violence placed squarely on them, whereas the LRA see themselves as 
fighting state oppression, which is not recognised by the ICC.  
Similarly, the traditional justice approach is not without difficulty and it is doubtful 
whether anyone, including many Acholi, would allow Kony to be ‘forgiven’ and then 
just to carry on living in Gulu. However, the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and it is by no means clear whether Kony would give himself up even if the 
Acholi were running a traditional process. 
A key question is why current approaches may be less effective than initially 
predicted. This is closely related to the causes of the conflict and the nature of the 
LRA itself. Fundamentally the LRA is a conventional rebellion with an added 
cosmological dimension. Many of the reasons for the fighting are related to material 
and historical grievances as well as issues related to social exclusion from economic 
networks. At the same time, there is also an element of mysticism surrounding the 
LRA, which may affect the balance of any peace process. Clearly if the material 
issues are important then conventional approaches to peace will provide an incentive 
to end the fighting, but these are likely to be less effective if the mystical effects of 
Kony’s ideology are more important. It is the contention of this article that no single 
approach will work because different elements of the LRA have different balances. In 
particular, there may be a good case for assuming that Kony is likely to want to keep 
the LRA going no matter what, either because he doesn’t wish to go to jail but also 
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because he is effectively a cult leader. In this case, one could make a good case for 
an illiberal solution of eliminating Kony himself and destroying the mystical elements 
of the LRA. 
Although much can be made of the religious/mystical element of the LRA it is not 
clear how many members of the LRA would just return to their homes if given the 
chance. Clearly elements of the LRA/M are negotiating, although their various 
constituencies are not always clear. The position of the Acholi Diaspora Group, for 
example, may not represent the position of Kony himself, although as always this is 
also unclear. What is possible is that different elements of the LRA will respond to 
conventional negotiations, material settlements and security guarantees, but that 
these groups would effectively split from Kony’s core group. The question remains 
just how isolated would he become and how small a group would be left. 
All of the above analysis begs questions about the likely outcomes of pursuing a 
liberal approach to peace. The history of the conflict leads to three likely 
consequences of these actions: continued action by Kony; conflicts within the LRA; 
and an escalation of violence but on a smaller scale. 
Questions remain over how many of the LRA are likely to remain loyal to Kony. Given 
that no-one actually knows how many members of the LRA there are, it is difficult to 
put numbers on this. What is clear is that there have clearly been strong 
disagreements within the LRA leadership itself, leading to telephone calls to the local 
press denying any splits, but then strong rumours of Otti being killed by Kony. The 
defection of several key individuals along with around one hundred combatants in 
2007 has raised further doubts.  
The LRA is clearly divided. The history of the peace talks has been, on the LRA side, 
distinctly opaque. There are a number of different groups who claim to be negotiating 
on the part of the LRA, but it is certainly not clear who is actually negotiating on 
behalf of Kony himself. 
Finally, the question remains of what is likely to happen if Kony and some members 
of the LRA stay in the bush. One outcome is that they could effectively live in exile, 
however, given the gradual escalation of the conflict, one possible outcome is that a 
smaller LRA carries on its campaign of extreme violence and begins kidnapping 
children again. This is clearly the fear of several Acholi elders, and in their view is 
made more likely by taking a very western approach to constructing a liberal peace 
through using liberal methods of transitional justice and setting in train a number of 
approaches – free markets, democracy through political parties - based on 
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competition without the underlying institutional development ensuring well-being. The 
approach of the ICC in seeking a rather narrow type of corrective justice has cast the 
Acholi people as victims, the Ugandan state as legitimately pursuing terrorists, and 
senior individuals within the LRA as perpetrators. This model may have some 
advantages, but it is a politically sensitive model and closes the opportunity for the 
Acholi themselves to take an active role in reconstructing a locally acceptable view of 
what ‘justice’ actually means in northern Uganda.  For the international community 
and the ICC in particular, it may lead to the lesson that justice may not mean exactly 
the same thing in all contexts and one size does not fit all. 
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1 From Jorge Luis Borges, Conjectural Poem. 
2 For the use of the term ‘international society’, see Makinda (2000).  
3 See, for example, Ralph (2005). 
4 See Ralph for a fuller explanation of this argument. Grotius is said to have provided the first 
justification for international intervention based on a solidarist tradition which views states as being 
bound by universal laws of nature, including an obligation to enforce those laws. 
5 Indeed this so-called lack of legitimacy is why the US refused to sign. 
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6 The crime of ‘aggression’ has yet to be clearly defined within the ICC. 
7 This is immediately obvious from the fractious nature of much of the internal documents and 
discussions within this group. 
8 This was not publicly known until 2004. In total there are five warrants detailing around 2,200 
killings. Kony himself is charged with 12 counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war 
crimes. 
9 A full discussion of traditional justice systems in northern Uganda is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the most common mechanism cited is known as mato oput (bitter root). An influential 
report by Dennis Pain called The Bending of the Spears cites this as a way forward in building peace 
but then adds another ceremony, gomo tong (bending of the spears) which symbolises the end of 
clan conflict in Acholi tradition. This would be carried out by Acholi elders and involves admission 
of responsibility, forgiveness and compensation. See Allen (2005) for the clearest explanation of 
these ceremonies. 
10 There has been a steady flow of former combatants turning themselves in and a reduction in 
violence since the introduction of the warrants. 
